It is a well-understood truth amongst constitutional students that no written constitution, however detailed and exact in its
provisions, can remain precisely as it was in the beginning in its application and interpretation.
The constitution of the United States, though assuming to lay down with exactness the division of legal functions, has exhibited a definite progress along certain well-defined lines. Acts which in the first year of the Republic would have been flouted as flagrantly unconstitutional are now upheld almost without question by the courts. In Canada, there has not been so definite and clear an example of constitutional growth by the science of legal interpretation, but nevertheless the Canadian constitution, as it actually operates, is very substantially different from what it was in the year after Confederation.
There is one difference between the constitutional development of Canada and that of the United States. Changes by interpretation in the United States have largely related to matters of jurisdiction as between the federal government and the state governments, though there has been some growth also in regard to the relations of the United States to outside powers. In the case of Canada, there has been no growth in the relations of the federal to the provincial governments, or with regard to federal and provincial jurisdiction. Growth has been almost entirely with reference to the relations of Canada to the British government and foreign powers. As to the latter class of subjects there has been substantial development. Whether it has gone so far as is alleged by some statesmen, may perhaps be questioned.
Canada certainly enjoys an equal status with South Africa, and General Smuts, the prime minister of South Africa, states in unmistakable terms that South Africa is a nation--that as prime minister thereof he is equal in status with the prime minister of Great Britain. How far this is true, I shall consider a little later.
Leaving this subject for the present, I return to the question of the relations between the federal government and the provinces and of the boundaries of their respective jurisdictions. These relations have given rise with tolerable continuity to disputes and litigation. Some litigation there must necessarily be where there is a written constitution, in order to determine the general principles of interpretation, but when this is admitted it still remains that there has been a large and undesirable amount of contention on these subjects. The result has been that Canadians have to some extent been hampered in their political thought and development by constitutional uncertainty. There have been from time to time what laymen, and many lawyers, regard as conflicting decisions. Uncertainty of jurisdiction has in some cases prevented important subjects from being dealt with in the manner desired by the people. To give an instance that is familiar, it is well known that it takes legislation from both Dominion and province to deal with the liquor traffic, and even when that is forthcoming litigation seems to be almost endless.
In a late case in Manitoba the Grain Act, a very important statute, in force for twenty years and originally drawn with the utmost care, has been challenged on the ground of unconstitutionality. ' The question arising under this litigation is as to the powers of the Dominion parliament with respect to "the regulation of trade and commerce". In this case, as in others, it has become very clear that the meaning of these words is not sufficiently definite, and that an amendment to the constitution making a proper definition is urgently required.
In another case before the Privy Council, known as the Alberta Great Waterways case, a decision was given which is interpreted by a high authority as meaning that with regard to a debt, unless both the debtor and the creditor are within the province, the legislature cannot legislate on •the subject of the debt. This decision, it may be said with all deference, is of doubtful legal soundness, and if given its full and logical scope would produce serious uncertainties and difficulties. Here again exact definition is required.
There are many other cases.
To sum up under this head, it may be said that, while under a written constitution there will be some litigation to determine principles of interpretation, we are afflicted with altogether too much uncertainty. In the light of fifty years' experience, it should be possible for a committee of constitutional lawyers to make a revision of the constitution which would have a most beneficial and clarifying effect.
To turn to another phase of the subject. It is becoming increasingly evident that in this democratic community there are many lines of thought being pursued, the possibility of which was not present to the minds of the framers of the constitution in an age that was simpler in its conceptions of government and less disposed to question the traditions of the past. There are considerable classes in Canada who advocate definite and somewhat 'radical changes in constitutional methods and, while there is little probability of any very radical change securing the assent of a decisive majority of the whole people, it is quite within the realm of possibility that particular provinces might wish to make changes which the constitution does not sanction. Suppose, for instance, that the people of a province desired to adopt in the transaction of their provincial business the principle of the initiative and the referendum, and to provide that their executive should hold office for a fixed period of years instead of being dependent upon a day-to-day majority of the legislature. It is not a question whether the rest of the people of Canada agree with this view or not. In the provincial sphere the business is the business of the people of the province, and if they think that they can control their government better and secure a more satisfactory disposition of public business by the adoption of these principles, it is entirely their affair.
Furthermore, there is plenty of room for argument as to the wisdom of such a course. Many thoughtful people doubt the desirability of cabinet government in the provinces. In the United States a state executive is not dependent on a majority in the state legislature. In other countries provincial government, on lines different from that which is possible under a responsible cabinet system, has worked fairly well. Anyone who gives the subject serious consideration will admit that the practice of regarding either a provincial or a Dominion government as being defeated by a catch vote on a non-essential matter of which no notice has been given is a rather absurd relic of the past.
• Now, if the people of a province desired to make such a change as is indicated above they would at once find themselves barred by the constitution. The British North America Act does, it is true, give the province power to amend its constitution, but with a most important exception, namely, that it can make no change in the office of the lieutenant-governor. The theory of the whole system is that the executive government is in the hands of the Crown--that is, so far as the province is concerned, in the hands of the lieutenant-governor. In theory, he is the administrator of all public business, acting of course on the advice of his ministers and through them, but in the result it will be seen that the provinces cannot effectively legislate to make any substantial change in the method of controlling and carrying on the executive government without touching upon the position of the Crown.
• With respect to this point, differences of opinion have been expressed; but I hardly think that anyone who has had experience in legislation and in the actual transaction of government business will deny that it is to all intents and purposes impracticable to make any substantial amendment without raising a question as to the validity of the measure. That is a practical bar to anything being done. It is, therefore, extremely desirable that there should be such an amendment to the constitution as would enable t A Farmer Convention in Manitoba has recently declared itself in opposition to this custom.
2The Privy Council held the Manitoba statute of 1010, which introduced the initiative and the referendum, to be ultra rites, on the ground that it interfered with the prerogative of the Crown as administered by the lieutenant-governor. the people of a province to simplify and more directly to control the transaction of provincial business.
A little consideration will make it evident that if changes of this kind cannot be made it tends to sterilize political thought, and either to discourage active-minded citizens from taking an interest in the conduct of affairs or to drive their mental activities into undesirable channels.
With respect to Dominion matters, the well-known illustration upon the subject is that of the Senate. (1) Those which concern the relative jurisdiction of the Dominion parliament and the provincial legislatures. I have given some illustrations above under this heading. He has probably never been in Canada. It is measurably certain that he would not be able to name the provinces of Canada without consulting a book, if he were asked to do so. It is also measurably certain that he has never read the British North America Act, and it is entirely certain that he has never read the leading cases upon its interpretation. He is unfamiliar with the state of facts in Canada which calls for the amendment.
He has no means of acquiring a knowledge of the facts. He cannot tell whether or not the people of Canada are in fayour of the change. He may find that the Dominion government desires the change, and that one or more of the provincial governments are opposed to it, or he may be advised that public opinion as indicated by the Canadian press is not unanimously in fayour of the change. In any and every case, he is perfectly helpless because he has no definite and conclusive method of satisfying himself. The result is that he will not act in regard to any important change unless the change seems to be unanimously desired. Now, it is quite obvious that if the proposed amendment is of serious importance there will be differences of opinion in Canada about it, and these differences will speedily be made evident. So soon as this takes place, the Colonial Secretary will decline to proceed any further.
In the result, therefore, no change whatever can be made, unless it is on some purely technical matter, or is of such trifling im- It must be said at once that all such provisions, and any provisions of a similar character that have come into effect subsequently, are fundamental and of the very essence of Confederation. No change can ever be made which will in any respect diminish or impair these guarantees. To suggest any such change would be to court the disruption of the Dominion. In considering the question of constitutional changes, therefore, it must be premised as a first and essential condition that all these guarantees should be protected.
This point being fully and satisfactorily provided for, there seems no reason why Canada should not be put in the same position as other democratic, self-governing communities and enabled to deal effectively with its governmental affairs in accordance with the wishes of the people. As to the particular method of bringing into effect constitutional changes, that is of course a matter for careful consideration. The nature of the provisions for effecting constitutional changes must depend upon whether it is desired to make these changes quickly and easily, or whether they are to be regarded as of such importance that very great safeguards should be thrown about them. I am a very strong adherent of the latter view.
The American provision for amendments to the constitution is an excellent one for Canada to follow, except that in the case of Canada I would require the province to ratify by popular vote instead of vote of the legislature. In fact, I am clearly of the opinion that any constitutional change, other than in matters of detail such as have been customarily dealt with by our parliaments and legislatures, should be submitted to a vote of the people before coming into effect.
I (3) The relationship to Great Britain and foreign powers. The illustrations given above, in my judgment, prove the necessity for changes under the first two divisions. It is not too radical to suggest that after fifty years' experience we should clear up the doubts, anomalies, and inconsistencies which have developed as between province and Dominion, nor will it be disputed that matters of internal economy, as, for instance, the constitution of the Senate, should be capable of amendment.
With respect to these matters, some are more urgent than others. Some might be dealt with on a first revision, and others might be left to be dealt with in the future under autonomous powers of amendment. The vital need, however, for constitutional action arises in connection with external affairs, by which I mean Canada's relations with everything and everybody outside of Canada, including the parent Empire. In respect to these relations there is imperative need of immediate action.
Our external relations are enveloped in what might be called a highly luminous but cloudy halo. The plain man who makes no pretence at the investigation of legal or constitutional subtleties must be in despair when he attempts to understand them. Not only is the subject in its very nature somewhat obscure and difficult to comprehend, but it suffers from the fact that almost everyone who debates it seems by an unhappy fatality to be seized with a desire to use high-sounding, sonorous, and sometimes self-contradictory language.
Here is a quotation from Sir Robert Borden:
Equality of nationhood must .be recognized, preserving unimpaired to each Dominion the full autonomous power which it now holds and safeguarding to each by necessary consultation and by adequate voice and influence its highest interests in the issues of peace and war. (15) There is no question of "a voice" or "consultation" or "adequate representation" with respect to foreign policy. According to Smuts, the Dominion is supreme and independent in regard to all foreign policy, and no closer union than the above will be tolerated. The machinery is the machinery of the British Government, the Foreign Office, the Ambassadors. The machine must remain here. It is impossible that it could be otherwise unless you had a Council of Empire where you had representatives elected for the purpose. Apart from that you must act through one instrument. The instrument of foreign policy of the Empire is the British Foreign Office. That has been accepted by all the Dominions as inevitable, but they claim a voice in determining the lines of our policy and at the last Imperial Conference they were here discussing our policy in Germany, our policy in Egypt, our policy in America, our policy all over the world, and we are now acting upon the mature and general decisions arrived at with the common consent of the whole Empire .......
It is evident that there is a wide difference between the

The advantage to us is that joint control means joint responsibility and when the burden of Empire has become so great it is well that
we should have the shoulders of these young giants under the burden to help us along. This is a remarkable and momentous declaration. It is desirable to make a statement on the position of Canada which shall be at once clear and definite and in accordance with law and fact.
I would state the position as follows: Canada started in life as a subordinate self-governing Dominion. She had certain powers given her definitely. Nearly all powers relating to internal affairs were accorded, but not quite all. She had no external powers whatever, and no relations with foreign countries. In the interpretation of her relations with the mother country the subordinate status was marked and unmistakable.
Almost immediately after 1867 the process of broadening the i.n'.terpretation of the constitution began, and continuously from that time forward the interpretation has become more and more liberal. The government of the Dominion has been permitted from time to time to extend its functions, until it may now be regarded as being indisputably supreme in all matters arising within Canada, except possibly one or two in respect of which it is claimed that Imperial interests arise modifying the right to independent action on the part of Canada.
As time passed, the Canadian government was permitted to acquire certain powers with respect to foreign countries. It is, therefore, essential that some proper method should be adopted whereby changes may be made in the constitution as it applies both to internal and external affairs. Every writer and speaker, Dominion or British, who has spoken or written upon the subject, agrees upon the propriety of this. Apart from this, however, it is no part of the scope of, this article to argue •or or against any particular change or amendment. Each proposal must be discussed on its merits when proposed. My purpose is not at. the moment to advocate any particular change, but to point out that changes are necessarily coming in the almost immediate future and that these changes should be dealt with deliberately and methodically, and not in a haphazard and accidental fashion.
At the impending Constitutional Conference in London, the subjects to be dealt with will be of far-reaching effect. The national destiny of Canada will be profoundly affected by the decisions arrived at. These decisions must be made by representatives of Canada on the one hand and representatives of the British government on the other.
Who shall these representatives of Canada be? How shall they be appointed? What will their instructions be? How will such instructions be prepared? What method will be adopted for ascertaining the wishes of the people of Canada upon the questions which are to be decided?
Hitherto it has apparently been taken for granted that in all these matters the prime minister of Canada should automatically be accepted as the representatives of Canada with such of his colleagues as he was pleased to designate or as were included in the invitation. Latterly, as somewhat of a concession to democratic ideas, it has been suggested that the leader of the opposition should be included in such a delegation, but this innovation has not yet been confirmed or put in practice.
It is to be noted that there has always been a pronounced attitude of reserve, reticence, and secretiveness on the part of the prime ministers and governments towards parliament and the people with regard to these matters. Sir Willrid Laurier never Categorically, the questions to be decided will be somewhat as follows:
(1) Shall Canada have complete autonomy in internal affairs and plenary power to amend her own constitution at will? (2) Shall such power be accompanied by a status of complete equality with the United Kingdom ? (3) Shall Canada join with General Smuts and say, "We have achieved our independence, and we desire steps to be taken to give that independence legal and international effect?" There are no questions which can ever arise with respect to any nation that are ,more important than these.
As I have said, an invitation will in due course come to the Canadian government to participate in the Conference at London which will settle these questions. No one of them has ever spoken or written anything, so far as we know, which in any respect whatever can be said to define his views except that Mr. Crerar has spoken against a centralizing tendency. The people of Canada, therefore, would be represented by three men whose opinions are unknown, and who have almost certainly never made any special study of the subjects that are to be dealt with. That would be rather undesirable, but it might be remedied because they can study the subjects now, and they can express their views so that people can know what they are.
There is, however, another difficulty which cannot be removed. Neither Mr. King, Mr. Crerar, nor Mr. Meighen have the faintest idea what the majority of the people of Canada think about these questions, and they have no way of finding out, even if they were willing to abjure their own views, and give effect to those of the people. If it be said that they can consult parliament, we are in no better case. The members of the new parliament know nothing whatever about the opinions of the people on these questions. If it be said that in any event it is the business of parliament to transact the nation's business, and that the opinions of the majority of parliament should govern, the answer to that proposition is conclusive. The members of the Canadian parliament are elected to carry on the affairs of the country under and in accordance with the constitution. Except in trifling details they have no authority whatever to change it.
What then are the views of the people on these questions? Nobody knows. It is quite certain that the opinions of the people are only half formed or not formed at all. Ninety-nine out of every hundred electors have never considered the questions. Before they can form their opinions there must be full discussion in the press and on the platform.
The proposition that any four or five members of parliament, however eminent, with unknown views and absolutely uninformed as to the views of the people, should blithely proceed to settle the destinies of the country, may be dismissed as unworthy of discussion. He would surely be a brave man who would accept the position of delegate under such circumstances. He might find his public career summarily terminated when he returned. Such, indeed, would be a very probable result. Public opinion in such cases crystallizes slowly, and sometimes along entirely unexpected lines. One thing, however, is absolutely certain. The people of Canada will in the long run insist on their national destiny being settled in conformity with their own views, and if anyone prematurely attempts to settle it without ascertaining their views the consequences are apt to be disastrous to the person or persons involved. This whole question is emphatically one for submission to the people. No good can come from any attempt to withdraw it from their deliberate judgment or to settle it behind tiled doors. Let us have a frank, full, and exhaustive discussion. The first suggestion is that a constitutional convention should be held composed of delegates elected directly by the people. Parliament could pass an Act dividing the country into districts, specifying the number of. delegates to be elected and providing the machinery of election. If this were done and the delegates were chosen on a large scheme of proportional representation, it is probable that it would result in a fairly complete representation of the views of all sections of the community. The convention thus elected would proceed to revise the constitution. It might be provided that the constitution so revised should forthwith be deemed to represent the wishes of the Canadian people or it might be provided that the revised constitution should be submitted to popular vote. Both these methods have been practised at different times in the United States. Another plan suggested is that the House of Commons should form a select committee, representing all parties, whose duty it would be to draft a revised constitution.
Such a committee would no doubt secure the assistance of the best constitutional lawyers. The result of the commiftee work would be reported to parliament, and by parliament submitted to the people.
In the case of either of the above plans it would be quite feasible when the submission is made to the people to place the matter before them in the shape of alternative propositions so that the voters would not be bound si. mply to the acceptance or rejection of a single formula.
These details need present no serious difficulty. The essential thing is to have a full discussion and an informed and authoritative expression of the people's wishes.
CLIFFORD SIFTON
